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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The rhetoric of securities market regulation is a rhetoric of
"fair and orderly markets," of the maintenance of public confi-
dence in the markets, and of investor protection.' If the regulators
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank Prakash
Shah, Christopher Johnson, and Kerry Fitzmaurice for research assistance with this
article. Participants at a faculty seminar at the University of Miami Law School and at
a seminar for alumni of the London School of Economics and Political Science made
valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. Michael Froomkin and Steve
Halpert gave helpful advice. © 1996 Caroline Bradley. All rights reserved.
1 See, e.g., SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION,
MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQuTY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 14-15
(Jan. 1994); Sir George Young, Financial Secretary, Address to the Financial Crime
Conference at the Cafe Royal (June 6, 1995), in HM Treasury Press Release 77/95
(" [T] o generate the investment and to attract the skills on which a successful financial
centre depends, the market must show that it is capable of operating, and actually
does operate in practice, in a respectable and orderly way. It is the Government's
view that markets only flourish where they are free, fair and adequately regulated.").
See generally ECONOMICS AND LANGUAGE (Willie Henderson et al. eds., 1993) (discuss-
ing the language and rhetoric of economics).
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can ensure that the markets operate in a fair and orderly manner,
investors will have the confidence to invest in securities issued by
businesses that need to raise capital. Disclosure requirements and
restrictions on insider trading are meant to make securities mar-
kets fair by giving all people equal access to information about se-
curities on those markets. 2 Regulations that control the way in
which securities trades are handled and cleared, or that attempt to
limit the price volatility of securities in the markets, are meant to
make the markets more orderly.
One of the techniques regulators use to ensure that their mar-
kets are "fair and orderly" is the trading halt. If some market par-
ticipants seem to be trading in a security on the basis of
information not available to all, the regulator may halt trading in
that security until the information is made generally available. If
the market in a particular security, or the market as a whole, is
particularly volatile, the regulator may halt trading in an attempt to
calm the market down. New rules to provide for general market
halts were introduced after the 1987 market crash, and gave rise to
conflicting views amongst commentators. Some argued that the
markets should be allowed to operate as they will, others argued
that markets should be rigidly controlled in the interests of inves-
tors and the public at large who must be protected from the dan-
gers of excess volatility.'
In all the discussion of general trading halts, however, little
attention has been paid to the problem of trading halts (or sus-
pensions) which apply to the securities of individual corporations,
and which raise similar questions.4 Specific suspensions have been
2 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. Doc. No.
9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (stating that manipulative practices should be
banned to ensure fair and honest markets). This article seeks to challenge some of
the methods used to achieve this objective; however, that objective is, itself, subject to
question. SeeJoel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the
Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MicH. L. REv. 649, 652 (1995)
("[T]he remediation of information asymmetries endures as a policy justification for
important aspects of federal securities regulation. But the need for a mandatory dis-
closure system varies significantly from context to context and is not static over
time.").
s See, e.g., Bruce C. Greenwald &Jeremy C. Stein, Transactional Risk, Market Crashes
and the Role of Circuit Breakers, 64J. Bus. 443, 461 (1991) ("A system of continuous
trading involving market and limit orders sacrifices some degree of informational effi-
ciency for timeliness."); Tamar Frankel, What Can be Done about Stock Market Volatility?,
69 Bos. U. L. REv. 991, 995-96 (1989) (objecting to market halts as an answer). For a
suggestion that not all types of volatility in investment markets are harmful, see Law-
rence Harris, The Dangers of Regulatory Overreaction to the October 1987 Crash, 74 Cornell
L. Rev. 927, 928 (1989).
4 But see generally Charles M.C. Lee et al., Volume, Volatility, and New York Stock Ex-
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used as a tool of regulation for some time, but they are at least as
suspect as (and may be even more suspect than) general trading
halts for a number of reasons. Specific suspensions are supposed
to protect investors from trading at an "inaccurate" price. How-
ever, it may be difficult to ensure that all trading in a specific secur-
ity is halted. Even if this is possible, it is at least arguable that the
halt of trading in a corporation's securities may harm investors who
are unable to obtain a remedy for the harm they suffer. The role
of corporate managements and financial intermediaries in the pur-
suit of a decision to halt trading is also suspect. Suspension of trad-
ing is an easy solution to a perceived problem, but too often it is
the wrong answer.
This Article poses a number of questions, comparing and con-
trasting the practice of halting trading in securities in the United
States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K). 5  First, as to the
substance of trading halts, why do suspensions occur, and in what
circumstances? Second, as to the process of halting trading, who
initiates halts, who has the power to order a halt, who is consulted
during the process, and who is allowed to challenge an order to
halt trading? The Article suggests that the answers to these ques-
tions raise serious concerns about the substance and process of
trading halts, which should be addressed.
This Article also examines the rhetoric of "fair and orderly
markets." Periodically, there are challenges to this rhetoric: the
insider-trading scandals of the 1980s suggested that the markets are
not always fair, and the 1987 stock market crash emphasized that
the markets do not always operate in an orderly way.6 But rather
than taking these challenges seriously and asking whether fair and
change Trading Halts, 49J. FIN. 183 (1994) (suggesting that firm-specific trading halts
on the New York Stock Exchange do not reduce trading volume or price volatility).
5 The United Kingdom (U.K.) and the United States (U.S.) are compared as the
sites of two of the major securities markets and as jurisdictions with which I am famil-
iar. Examination of the rules in the U.K. requires reference to European Community
(EC) law because the objectives of the European Union involve the attainment of a
European capital market through harmonization of rules and the removal of barriers
to entry.
6 See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, SPECIAL REPORT No.
319, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) (Jan. 1988); SECURrrlES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVI-
SION OF MARKET REGULATION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK, SPECIAL REPORT No.
1271, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Feb. 1988); see generally Greenwald & Stein, supra note
3; Frankel, supra note 3; Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A
Legal and Public Policy Analysis, 57 FoRHAM L. REv. 191 (1988);Jerry W. Markham &
Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987-The United States Looks at New
Recommendations, 76 GEt. LJ. 1993 (1988); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets,
the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 907 (1989).
1996] 599
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orderly markets are really attainable, politicians and commentators
continue to operate within the terms of this rhetoric. This Article
argues that the rhetoric of "fair and orderly markets" misleads the
investors whom securities regulators claim to protect.
2.0 FAIR AND ORDERLY SECURITIES MARKETS
The Securities Exchange Act of 19347 was designed to control
abuses in the secondary market in securities.' In particular, section
2(3) of the statute suggested that volatility in the markets caused by
manipulation and speculation impeded the financing of industry
and hindered the proper appraisal of the value of securities.9 Sec-
tion 2 of the Act set out the objective of ensuring "fair and honest
markets." The Act provided for the registration of securities ex-
changes with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and al-
lowed the SEC to take measures that were "necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.""0 The Act also referred to the need to ensure 'Just and equi-
table principles of trade,""1 and "fair dealing."12 A specialist who
could act as a dealer under the rules of a stock exchange should be
restricted by those rules to dealings which were "reasonably neces-
sary to permit him to maintain a fair and orderly market."'"
In 1934, "fair and orderly markets" were markets which were
free from manipulation, speculation, and insider abuses. The term
has developed a rather different meaning over time. This is partly
because Congress decided in 1975 to change the SEC's mission for
the control of exchange activity. The 1975 amendments to the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 directed the SEC to facilitate a na-
tional market system having regard to public interest, protection of
investors, and maintenance of fair and orderly markets. 14 As a re-
sult of this amendment, the SEC was charged with managing the
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-u (1994) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
8 See 4 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1731-34 (3d ed.
1990).
9 See CHARLES H. MEYER, THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 ANALYZED AND
EXPLAINED 28 (Rothman & Co. 1994) (1934); see also HOUSE COMMITTEE, supra note 2.
10 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (2).
11 Id. § 78f(b).
12 Id. § 78f(d).
IS Id. § 78k(b)(2).
14 See Securities Acts Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 7, 89 Stat. 97, 111-12
(1975) [hereinafter 1975 Amendments] (adding section 78k-1 to the Act); MARKET
2000, supra note 1, at 1-2 (concerning Study I: Introduction and Historical
Background).
600 [Vol. 26:597
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securities markets.15 The change in our understanding of the
phrase is partly due to developments in financial economics. The
debate about how securities markets should be regulated is no
longer simply a debate about the best way to eliminate market
abuses, but is a debate about whether regulation should and can be
designed to promote market efficiency. 6
An efficient capital market is one in which prices fully and in-
stantaneously reflect all available information so that prices are ac-
curate signals for resource allocation. A fair and competitive
marketplace and rational profit-seeking investors should give rise
to an efficient capital market. 7 The efficient capital markets hy-
pothesis has been described in the U.S. as "the context in which
serious discussion of the regulation of financial markets takes
place."18 The SEC and the courts have used the efficient capital
15 See, e.g., MARSHALL E. BLUME ET AL., REVOLUTION ON WALL STREET 173-74 (1993);
Ludlow Corp. v. SEC, 604 F.2d 704, 708-11 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (extending unlisted trad-
ing privileges to be "consistent with the maintenance of fair and orderly markets and
the protection of investors"). Congress adopted this standard in the 1975 Amend-
ments, supra note 14, § 8, at 117-18. This language replaced the standard that had
been in effect since 1964, under which the Commission was required to find that
extending unlisted trading privileges would be "necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-467, § 3, 78 Stat. 565, 565-66 (1964). "Thus, Congress retained the 'protec-
tion of investors' requirement but substituted 'fair and orderly markets' for the 'pub-
lic interest' standard. Although the meaning of this change is not obvious on its face,
we take it to be that henceforth unlisted trading applications are to be evaluated, at
least insofar as their effect on the securities markets is concerned, with primary refer-
ence to the congressional purposes of the 1975 Amendments." Ludlow Corp. v. SEC,
604 F.2d 704, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
16 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities
Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. Rv. 611, 613 (1985). The authors note:
The stated objective of securities law is to make markets function effi-
ciently-not to redistribute income or reshape preferences. True, peo-
ple sometimes say that the function of securities law is "the protection of
investors" or "compensation for wrongs," but these are just restatements
of the objective of efficient operation of the markets. When markets
efficiently respond to information, the price of securities adjusts, and
this protects all investors--even uninformed ones.
Id.
17 The hypothesis has different forms: the strong form, which suggests that all in-
formation, public and private, is incorporated into prices; the semi-strong form,
which suggests that all publicly available information is incorporated into prices; and
the weak form, which suggests that historical information is incorporated into prices.
See, e.g., Michael Firth, The Efficient Markets Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCE 7 (Michael
Firth & Simon M. Keane eds., 1986); see generally RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS (2d ed. 1983); EUGENE FAMA, FOUN-
DATIONS OF FINANCE (1976).
18 RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 550 (1984).
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markets hypothesis in the development of the law19 but, increas-
ingly, commentators argue that regulators and judges should be
careful about basing legal rules on this hypothesis.2" Some criti-
cisms of the use of the hypothesis as a policy tool are normative,
others are positive. The efficient capital markets hypothesis may
not be an accurate description of how the securities markets work;
even if it is, this may not really be relevant for the policy goals of
securities regulation.
The Financial Services Act of 198621 is the basis for the control
of investment business in the U.K. by the Securities and Invest-
ments Board. As the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted
in response to scandals in the securities markets, so was the Finan-
cial Services Act enacted.22 Before the draft legislation was intro-
duced into Parliament, the government of the U.K. expressed its
aim to achieve efficiency, fairness, competitiveness, and flexibility
in the regulation of investment business.28 Schedule 4 of the Act
sets out the requirements for the recognition of investment ex-
changes, and provides that "[t]he rules and practices of the ex-
change must ensure that business conducted by means of its
facilities is conducted in an orderly manner and so as to afford
proper protection to investors."2 4 The exchange must also be "able
19 See, e.g., SEC, Securities Act Release No. 33-6235 (Sept. 2, 1980); SEC, Securities
Act Release No. 33-6332 to 33-6338 (Aug. 6, 1981); SEC, Securities Act Release No. 33-
6383 (Mar. 3, 1982); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-45 (1988) (ac-
cepting the "fraud on the market" theory based on the efficient capital markets hy-
pothesis); see generally Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the
Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945 (1991); William J. Carney, The Limits of the Fraud on the
Market Doctrine, 44 Bus. LAw. 1259 (1989); Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan,
Using Finance Theoy to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 U.C.LA. L.
REV. 883 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey, The Fraud on the Market Theoy: Some Preliminay
Issues, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 923 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good
Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of Fraud-on-the-Market Theoy, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059
(1990).
20 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The
Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 546
(1994); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761 (1985); Henry T. C. Hu, New Financial
Products, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare,
69 TEX. L. REV. 1273 (1991); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613
(1988).
21 Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60 (Eng.) [hereinafter Financial Services Act].
22 See L.C.B. COWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT
(HMSO 1982); L.C.B. COWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION REPORT: PART 1,
(1984) Cmnd. 9125.
23 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUS., FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A
NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION, (1985) Cmnd. 9432, at 6.
24 Financial Services Act, supra note 21, Schedule 4, 2(1). The exchange must
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and willing to promote and maintain high standards of integrity
and fair dealing" and to cooperate with regulators. 5 The U.K. leg-
islation seems to reflect the same rhetoric of fair and orderly mar-
kets that appears in the U.S. federal legislation, although the
implementation of the rhetoric is different in the different jurisdic-
tions. In the U.K. the efficient capital markets hypothesis has had
much less impact on the law than in the U.S.26
The European Union's (EU) objective of achieving a Euro-
pean capital market is similar to the objective of achieving a na-
tional market system in the U.S., although the EU legislator has the
power to make general rules that must be implemented in the vari-
ous member states, rather than being able to control securities
markets in the EU directly. While there is no EU securities regula-
tory body, EU legislation does reflect the rhetoric of fair and or-
derly markets. For example, the insider dealing directive refers to
the "smooth operation of the market."27 The directive states that
the smooth operation of the market depends on investor confi-
dence, which in turn depends on the assurance that investors are
on an equal footing and will be protected from the improper use
of inside information."8 The explanation of the term "smooth op-
eration of the market" suggests that it refers to what would be de-
scribed in U.S. terminology as fairness, but the term would seem
more appropriate in reference to orderliness of the market. In the
investment services directive, the term is used in the context of
transparency requirements.
2 9
Ideas of fair and orderly markets are therefore important in
only allow dealings in investments in which there is "a proper market" and require the
provision of the proper information for determining the current value of investments.
Id. 2(2). There must be arrangements for clearing and recording transactions, and
there must also be systems for monitoring and enforcement of compliance with the
exchange's rules and for the investigation of complaints. Id. 2(4), 2(5), 3, 4.
25 Id. 5.
26 But see, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUS., Consultative Document, Listing
Particulars and Public Offer Prospectuses, Implementation of Part V of the Financial Services
Act 1986 and Related EC Directives 13 (1990); DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUS., Consult-
ative Document, Summary Financial Statements for Listed Public Limited Companies 2
(1989).
27 Council Directive 89/592/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 334/30) recital 6 (coordinating
regulations on insider dealing).
28 Id. at recitals 3, 4.
29 Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 1993 OJ. (L 141/27) recital 42 ("Whereas, with
the two-fold aim of protecting investors and ensuring the smooth operation of the
markets in transferable securities, it is necessary to ensure that transparency of trans-
actions is achieved and that the rules laid down for that purpose in this Directive for
regulated markets apply both to investment firms and to credit institutions when they
operate on the market.").
1996]
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the U.S. and the U.K. The power of securities regulators or ex-
changes to suspend trading in securities in certain (or uncertain)
circumstances is supposed to contribute to the achievement and
maintenance of these fair and orderly markets.
3.0 WHEN DOES THE POWER TO SUSPEND ARISE?
3.1 In the United States
The SEC and national securities exchanges have power to sus-
pend trading in securities in the United States. The bases for these
powers are set out in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.30 The
SEC may summarily suspend trading in any security (other than an
exempted security) for a period not exceeding ten business days if,
in its opinion, the suspension is necessary in the public interest and
for the protection of investors.31 In order to ensure the effective-
ness of an order under this provision, members of a national secur-
ities exchange, brokers and dealers are prohibited from using the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to
effect transactions in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, sus-
pended securities. 2 Review of an order to suspend trading is to be
based only on an examination of all the information available to
the SEC at the time of the order, and a court must not enter a stay,
writ of mandamus, or similar relief unless it finds that the SEC's
decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law.33
In addition to the power to suspend trading summarily for up
to ten days, the SEC also has the power, under section 12(j) of the
30 See 1934 Act, supra note 7, § 781(k) (as amended by the Market Reform Act of
1990, Pub. L. 101-432, 104 Stat. 963); Securities Reforms of 1990, 1424 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 2062 (Dec. 6, 1990) (providing also for general trading halts).
31 1934 Act, supra note 7, § 781(k) (1) (A). On the legislative history of this provi-
sion, see generally Comment, Summay and Successive Suspension of Trading Under the
Exchange Act of 1934: The Constitution, the Congress and the SEC, 18 CAmH. U. L. REv. 57
(1968). Section 781(k) (1) (B) provides for summary suspensions of all trading on any
national securities exchange or otherwise for a period of up to 90 days, and
§ 781(k) (2) gives power to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to take action
in emergencies. This provision was originally in § 19(4) of the Act. For commentary
on this provision, see MEYER, supra note 9, at 122 ("This action, being of an emer-
gency character, may be taken without notice to the issuer, and in that respect differs
from the more drastic action of complete withdrawal or longer suspension of registra-
tion. One of the purposes of this power is to permit the Commission, in cases which
appear to it to be flagrant, to stop trading in a security pending the hearing which the
issuer is entitled to receive before registration can be entirely revoked or suspended
for a greater period of time.").
32 1934 Act, supra note 7, § 781(k) (4).
33 Id. § 781(k) (5).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to suspend the registration of a
security for up to twelve months for the protection of investors on
finding, after notice and the opportunity for a hearing, that the
issuer has failed to comply with any provision of the Act. Under
the same provision, the SEC may also decide to revoke the registra-
tion of the security in question. This provision has been criticized
by one commentator as draconian, harmful to innocent security
holders, and unnecessary, because even minor contraventions of
the rules may lead to a suspension of trading.3 4 However, this pro-
vision does not allow for the summary suspension of trading in a
security and is the provision that should be used for lengthy peri-
ods of suspension. 5
The SEC is not the only body in the U.S. with authority to
suspend trading in securities, because Rule 12d2-1 under the 1934
Act3 6 provides that national exchanges may suspend trading in ac-
cordance with their own rules, provided that they notify the SEC of
the suspension, and that the suspension is not designed to evade
the provisions of Section 12(d) of the Act.
37
34 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 1897 ("When a registrant fails to comply
with some provision of the statute or the Commission's rules, it makes little sense to
visit the sin on the innocent security holders by depriving them of an exchange mar-
ket, not to mention the statutory advantages of registration. More than that, the rem-
edy is unnecessary in view of the availability of a judicial action for mandatory
injunction to require the filing of adequate reports.").
35 In SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 110-23 (1978), the Supreme Court held that
although there may be periodic redetermination of whether such action is required
by "the public interest" and for "the protection of investors," the Commission is not
empowered to issue, "based upon a single set of circumstances, a series of summary
orders which would suspend trading beyond the initial 10-day period." Concurring
Justices Brennan and Marshall emphasized that the Court's opinion did "not reveal
how flagrantly abusive" the SEC's use of its summary suspension power had been. 436
U.S. 103, 123 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that "the record is
replete with suspensions lasting the better part of a year").
36 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-1 (1994).
37 That section provides, in part:
If the exchange authorities certify to the Commission that the security
has been approved by the exchange for listing and registration, the re-
gistration shall become effective thirty days after the receipt of such cer-
tification by the Commission or within such shorter period of time as
the Commission may determine. A security registered with a national
securities exchange may be withdrawn or stricken from listing and regis-
tration in accordance with the rules of the exchange and, upon such
terms as the Commission may deem necessary to impose for the protec-
tion of investors, upon application by the issuer or the exchange to the
Commission; whereupon the issuer shall be relieved from further com-
pliance with the provisions of this section and [section 78m] of this title
and any rules or regulations under such sections as to the securities so
withdrawn or stricken....
1934 Act, supra note 7, § 781(d).
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The New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE) Rule 499 states that:
"[s] ecurities admitted to the list may be suspended from dealings
or removed from the list at any time." 8 The NYSE "may make an
appraisal of, and determine on an individual basis, the suitability
for continued listing of an issue in the light of all pertinent facts
whenever it deems such action appropriate." Factors which may be
considered include "any other event or condition which may exist
or occur that makes further dealings and listing of the securities on
the Exchange inadvisable or unwarranted in the opinion of the Ex-
change."39 The NYSE Listed Company Manual identifies "Numeri-
cal and Other Criteria" for continued listing of securities, but these
are expressed to be guidelines that do not limit the Exchange's
powers.4 These criteria include a substantial reduction of operat-
ing assets, breach of listing or other agreements with the Ex-
change, and operations involving the company or its management
which "in the opinion of the Exchange, are contrary to the public
interest."4 The Exchange may hold a public hearing in connec-
tion with its consideration of the suspension of trading in a
security.
Brief suspensions of trading in securities may also occur as a
result of Rule llb-1, under which stock exchanges must require
each specialist to "assist in the maintenance, so far as practicable,
of a fair and orderly market" and to engage only in dealings that
are "reasonably necessary to permit him to maintain a fair and or-
derly market."4 2 The duty imposed on specialists as a result of this
rule is at times onerous, because the maintenance of a fair and
orderly market involves trading against the market: during the
1987 crash, the resources of specialists were strained considera-
bly.43 Exchange rules do, however, provide some protection for
specialists, allowing trading in a security to be suspended where at
the start of the trading session there is an imbalance of buy and sell
38 NYSE Rule 499, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2499 (1993).
39 Id. 1 2499, at 4225-26.
40 See id. 2499, at 4226. The manual also sets out a procedure for the delisting of
securities. See id. 1 2499, at 4229-30.
41 Id. 2499, at 4226.
42 Rule llb-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1 (1992); NYSE Rule 104, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) 2104 (1994).
43 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 3, at 999; cf Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The
Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock
Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1007, 1032-34 (1990) (suggesting that specialists may
impede liquidity); Dale Arthur Oesterle et al., The New York Stock Exchange and its Out-
Moded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate to Survive?, 17J. CoRnP. L. 223, 282-95
(1992) (suggesting that specialists may induce price volatility in markets).
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orders relating to that security." Although these suspensions are
supposed to occur only in "unusual situations," two researchers
found in 1978 that almost three temporary suspensions, on aver-
age, occurred per trading day on the NYSE.45
The Constitution of the American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
gives its Board of Governors the power, at any time and without
notice, to suspend dealings in any security (or to remove a security
from listed or unlisted trading). The Exchange will consider sus-
pending trading in a security where the issuer's financial condition
and/or operating results appear unsatisfactory; where it appears
that public distribution of the security or its aggregate market value
is reduced to a level where further dealings on the Exchange are
inadvisable; where the issuer has disposed of its principal operating
assets or is not an operating company; where the issuer is in breach
of its listing obligations; or where "any other event shall occur or
any condition shall exist which makes further dealings on the Ex-
change unwarranted."4 6
The American Stock Exchange has adopted guidelines that in-
dicate when circumstances may result in a suspension of trading.
For example, the public distribution of a security is likely to be
regarded as inadequate where the number of shares of common
stock that are publicly held is less than 200,000, or where the total
number of round lot shareholders of common stock of record is
less than 300.4 7 AMEX emphasizes, however, that the guidelines
should not be regarded as limiting its discretion to suspend deal-
ings in a particular security when it deems such action to be appro-
priate.48 In addition, some of the guidelines are very general. For
example, AMEX may suspend dealings in a security where "the
company or its management shall engage in operations which, in
the opinion of the Exchange, are contrary to the public interest."4 9
The AMEX Company Guide sets out in some detail the procedures
44 Cf SEC, Order for Suspension of Trading, 46 Fed. Reg. 37,146 (1981) (relating
to Chipola Oil Corp.).
45 See Michael H. Hopewell & Arthur L. Schwartz, Jr., Temporary Trading Suspensions
in Individual NYSE Securities, 33J. FIN. 1355, 1355 (1978).
46 See Policies With Respect to Continued Listing, Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH)
10,376 (1992).
47 See Application of Policies, Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 10,377 (1993).
48 The guidelines "in no way limit or restrict the Exchange in applying its policies
regarding continued listing and the Exchange may at any time, in view of the circum-
stances in each case, suspend dealings in, or remove, a security from listing or un-
listed trading when in its opinion such security is unsuitable for continued trading on
the Exchange. Such action will be taken regardless of whether the issuer meets or
fails to meet any or all of the guidelines." See id. 10,377, at 3599-600.
49 Id. 10,377, at 3601.
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that apply to the delisting of securities, 5° but no such detailed pro-
cedures apply to suspensions of trading.
In order to protect investors and the public interest, the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) may halt trading in
securities traded through the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) system pending the dis-
semination of material news. 5 1 For the same purposes, the NASD
may halt trading on the over-the-counter market in securities
which are listed on a national securities exchange where the ex-
change has halted trading to permit the dissemination of material
news, 52 or may halt trading by ITS/CAES (Intermarket Trading
System/Computer Assisted Execution System) market makers in
listed securities where a national securities exchange has halted
trading because of an order imbalance or influx.
53
3.2 In the United Kingdom
Rules governing the official listing of securities in the EU have
been harmonized by means of a number of EU directives that re-
quire the Member States to introduce national implementing
measures.54 In addition to regulating the admission of securities to
listing, the Admissions Directive allows Member States to impose
on issuers obligations to inform the public regularly about their
financial position and the general course of their business5 5 and to
publicize an issuer's failure to comply with continuing obligations
50 See Delisting Procedures, Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 10,379A (1992).
51 SeeTrading Halts, NASD Manual (CCH) Schedule D, 1806A, § 5(a)(1) (1994)
(stating that such halts usually last for half an hour after the appearance of the mate-
rial news on wire services). "A trading halt provides the public with an opportunity to
evaluate the information and consider it in making investment decisions. It also alerts
the marketplace to the fact that news has been released." Id. 1980A, at 1573. The
NASD's authority to suspend trading in securities derives from sections 15A(b) (6)
and 15A(h)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
52 Id. 1806A, § 5(a)(2), at 1572.
53 See id. 1806A, § 5(a) (3), at 1572. Article III, section 42 of the NASD's Rules of
Fair Practice prohibit NASD members from effecting transactions in the over-the-
counter market in a security subject to an NASD trading halt.
54 See generally Council Directive 79/279/EEC, 1979 O.J. (L 66/21) [hereinafter
the Admissions Directive] (coordinating the conditions for the admission of securities
to official stock exchange listing); Council Directive 80/390/EEC, 1980 O.J. (L 100/
1) (as amended by Council Directive 87/345/EEC, 1987 OJ. (L 185/81) and Council
Directive 94/18/EEC, 1994 OJ. (L 135/1)) [hereinafter the Listing Particulars Direc-
tive] (coordinating the requirements for the drawing up, scrutiny and distribution of
the listing particulars to be published for the admission of securities to official stock
exchange listing); Council Directive 82/121/EEC, 1982 O.J. (L 48/26) (regarding
information to be published on a regular basis by companies with shares admitted to
official stock exchange listing).
55 See generally Admissions Directive, supra note 54, at Article 5(4). For further
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of listing.5 6 Issuers must provide the authorities responsible for list-
ing (the "competent authority") with all the information consid-
ered appropriate by the authority in order to protect investors or
ensure the smooth operation of the market;57 the competent au-
thority may also require the issuer to publish information to pro-
tect investors or the smooth operation of the market.5
Article 14(1) of the Directive provides that: "The competent
authorities may decide to suspend the listing of a security where
the smooth operation of the market is, or may be, temporarily
jeopardized or where protection of investors so requires."59 More-
over, the competent authorities may discontinue the listing of a
security where they are satisfied that, because of special circum-
stances, normal regular dealings in a security are no longer possi-
ble.6" The Admissions Directive requires Member States to ensure
that it is possible for decisions refusing admission to listing and
discontinuing a listing to be challenged in court.6" There is no
provision for challenges to a decision to suspend a listing.
In the U.K., the provisions of the Admissions Directive are re-
flected in the Financial Services Act of 1986, which provides that
the Council of the Stock Exchange is the authority vested with the
powers relating to the listing of shares in the U.K62 Until 1984,
when the provisions of the Admissions Directive were first imple-
mented in the U.K.,6 the Stock Exchange was a completely private
body with no statutory authority for its control over stock market
activity.' Now its statutory powers include the power6 5 to delist
provisions on continuing obligations of issuers of listed securities, see id. Schedule C;
see also generally Council Directive 82/121/EEC, supra note 54.
56 See Admissions Directive, supra note 54, at Artide 12.
57 See id. at Article 13(1).
58 See id. at Article 13(2).
59 See id. at Article 14(1).
60 See id. at Article 14(2).
61 See id. at Article 15.
62 See Financial Services Act, supra note 21, at § 142(6). Section 157 of the Act
provides that the Secretary of State may transfer these functions to another body if it
appears to him: "(a) that the Council is exercising those functions in a manner which
is unnecessary for the protection of investors and fails to take into account the proper
interests of issuers and proposed issuers of securities; or (b) that it is necessary to do
so for the protection of investors." Id. § 157.
63 See Stock Exchange (Listing) Regulations 1984, S.I. 716 (1984) (implementing
the provisions of the Admissions Directive).
64 BOARD OF TRADE, THE COMPANY LAW COMM., REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW CoM-
MrrTEE, (1962) Cmnd. 1749, 1962, 227, at 84-85 ("Thus it may be argued that the
one effective sanction possessed by the Stock Exchange (viz. the refusal or suspension
of official quotations) is by definition incomplete, and less effective than a plain statu-
tory power, vested in an independent body, of stopping undesirable offers.").
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securities if it is satisfied that special circumstances preclude nor-
mal regular dealings in the securities and the power to suspend the
listing of any securities.66 This statutory provision does not contain
any real limitation on the power of the Stock Exchange to suspend
trading in securities; because of the doctrine of the supremacy of
Community law,6 7 however, it is invalid to the extent that it con-
flicts with Community law.68 National courts within the EU must
interpret domestic law in accordance with Community law.69
The London Stock Exchange's Listing Rules (the "Yellow
Book") contain the listing rules which apply in the U.K. and em-
phasize that the Exchange has the power to suspend "with effect
from such time as it may determine, the listing of any securities at
any time and in such circumstances as it thinks fit (whether or not
at the request of the issuer or its sponsor on its behalf)."7" This
power may be exercised "[w]here the smooth operation of the
market is, or may be, temporarily jeopardised or where protection
of investors so requires."7 Suspension of a listing may occur at the
65 These powers are subject to the detailed listing rules, rules which are laid down
by the Stock Exchange itself, but which could be invalid to the extent that they contra-
vened relevant provisions of EC directives.
66 See Financial Services Act, supra note 21, § 145.
67 See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585 (July 15, 1964); Case 106/
77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629 (Mar.
9, 1978); Case C-213/89, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame,
1990 E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 818.
68 The U.K statutory provision is clearly broader than the power contemplated by
the Admissions Directive. Note, however, that Article 5(2) of the Admissions Direc-
tive, supra note 54, provides that: "Member States may make the issuers of securities
admitted to official listing subject to more stringent obligations than those set out in
Schedules C and D or to additional obligations, provided that these more stringent
and additional obligations apply generally for all issuers or for individual classes of
issuer." This provision could be interpreted to extend the suspension power of com-
petent authorities in some ways.
69 See, e.g., Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,
1984 E.C.R. 1891, [19861 2 C.M.LR. 430; Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La
Comercial Internacional de Alimentaci6n SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
305, 8, at 322-23 ("[Iln applying national law, whether the provisions in question
were adopted before or after the directive, the national court called upon to interpret
it is required to do so, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose
of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby com-
ply with the third paragraph of Article 189 EEC."); Case C-421/92, Habermann-
Beltermann v. Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Bezirksverband Ndb/Opf eV, E.C.J., (Sixth Cham-
ber) 1994 I.R.L.R. 364, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 681.
70 London Stock Exchange, The Listing Rules, ch. 1, 1.18 (1993) [hereinafter the
Yellow Book]; see also London Stock Exchange, The Listing Rules-Consultation Draft,
ch. 1 at 1.18 (1992).
71 Yellow Book, supra note 70, at ch. 1, 1.18; see also London Stock Exchange, The
Listing Rules-Consultation Draft, ch. 1, 1.18 (Nov. 1992). The wording reflects that
of the Admissions Directive.
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issuer's request made by its sponsoring member firm, or may be
imposed on the issuer. One concrete circumstance in which a sus-
pension may be imposed upon an issuer is where the Exchange has
censured a director of the issuer because of willful or persistent
failure by the director to discharge his responsibilities and has
stated that, in its opinion, the director's retention of his office is
prejudicial to the interests of investors.72 The Stock Exchange
states that the procedure for lifting a suspension depends on the
circumstances, and that it reserves the right to impose conditions
for the lifting of the suspension.7 3 Where a suspension continues
for a long time without the issuer taking adequate action to have
the listing restored, the Committee on Quotations may cancel the
listing."4
The actions of the Stock Exchange are subject to judicial re-
view, which could result in the quashing of a decision of the Ex-
change. However, judicial review actions in the U.K. against
commercial regulatory bodies are rarely successful. For example,
in one case the Court of Appeal suggested that it would be most
unlikely for the Take-over Panel to act unfairly in exercising its reg-
ulatory functions.75 In the same case, the court emphasized that
timing was a crucial factor in the regulation of takeover activity and
that challenges of the Take-over Panel's decisions should be his-
toric, rather than contemporaneous. It is likely that a court would
find that the same considerations applied in relation to a suspen-
sion of a listing of securities.
72 London Stock Exchange, The Listing Rules, supra note 70, at ch. 1, 1 1.8. The
consultation draft also explicitly states that non-compliance with the listing rules may
result in suspension of a listing. See London Stock Exchange, The Listing Rules-Con-
sultation Draft, supra note 70, 1 1.5(c).
73 Id. ("In some cases (for example a temporary suspension pending an announce-
ment) the suspension will be lifted when the announcement is made. In other cases
(for example a reverse take-over) the suspension will be continued until the proposal
has been approved by the shareholders in general meeting and listing particulars
have been published .. "); seeYellow Book, supra note 70, at 1.20.
74 Yellow Book, supra note 70, at 11 1.21-.22. Paragraph 1.22 states that special
circumstances which might lead to cancellation of a listing would include "a suspen-
sion lasting longer than six months without the issuer taking adequate action to ob-
tain the restoration of listing. During a suspension the Exchange will review the
progress made by the issuer towards obtaining restoration and will notify the issuer in
advance of the intention to cancel the listing on a specified date." Id. 1 1.22; cf
London Stock Exchange, The Listing Rules-Consultation Draft, supra note 70, at ch. 1,
1.22 (stating that cancellation would normally follow "a suspension lasting longer
than six months without the issuer taking adequate action to obtain restoration of
listing" and that the Exchange will review the progress by the issuer to obtain restora-
tion after a suspension has lasted for three months).
75 See R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers ex p Datafin, [1987] 2 W.L.R. 699; see
also R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers ex p Guinness, [1989] 1 All E.R. 509.
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4.0 REASONS FOR THE SUSPENSION OF DEALINGS IN SECURITIES
Comparison of statutory provisions for the suspension of trad-
ing in securities in the U.S. and EC reveals that legislators and reg-
ulators agree on a rationale for suspensions: the suspension must
be necessary in the public interest (or, in the EU, if the smooth
operation of the market is, or may be, temporarily jeopardized)
and for the protection of investors. These provisions do not, how-
ever, define when a suspension is necessary to protect the public,
investors, or the smooth operation of the market, or what a "fair
and orderly market" is.76 Where rules of exchanges contain de-
tailed guidelines as to the circumstances in which suspensions may
occur, they emphasize that the exchange may suspend even in cir-
cumstances not covered by the guidelines. Thus, in order to un-
derstand the reach of the statutory provisions, it is necessary to
examine instances of suspension which reveal the way in which reg-
ulators apply these provisions. Typically, however, announcements
of suspensions are brief and relatively uninformative,77 and they do
not explain why the public interest and the protection of investors
require the suspension of trading in the securities in question. Nor
do the orders give any suggestion that the decision process that led
to the order involved any weighing of the relative costs and bene-
fits of a suspension.
It is common for trading in securities to be suspended for
short periods of time due to imbalances of buy or sell orders, or
because of pending news announcements that are likely to have a
76 See, e.g., Macey & Kanda, supra note 43, at 1026 ("Unfortunately... no one has
ever come up with a good definition of what it means to maintain a fair and orderly
market."); see also ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION
84-86 (1992) (setting forth the problems faced by a regulator subjected to vague obli-
gations, such as the obligation to maintain fair and orderly markets).
77 For example, the SEC's order for suspension of trading in the securities of
Sanyo Industries, Inc. stated:
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission)
that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the
securities of Sanyo Industries, Inc. concerning, among other things, (1)
questions regarding the identity of persons having undisclosed control
of the company, and (2) questions concerning the identities of persons
having beneficial ownership of the company's securities, and the result-
ing impact on the market for Sanyo Industries, Inc.'s securities.
The Commission is of the opinion that the public interest and the
protection of investors require a suspension of trading in the securities
of the above listed company.
Order of Suspension of Trading, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,465 (Dec. 24, 1992) (suspending




significant impact on the price of a security.7" Typical trading halts
on the NYSE last for one hour, although there are variations de-
pending on the reason for the halt. Trading halts arising from im-
balances tend to be shorter, while those caused by pending news
announcements tend to be longer.
79
The circumstances in which regulators decide to suspend trad-
ing in securities seem to resolve themselves into three general cate-
gories: fraud, inadequate information, and failure to comply with
continuing obligations of listing other than those relating to the
provision of information. The category of inadequate information
includes financial problems and uncertainty about the company's
financial position, an impending transaction, and the existence of
rumors. Regulators sometimes suspend the securities of one com-
pany for more than one reason, so, in one case in the U.K., a sus-
pension initiated because the Chairman of the issuer was accused
of insider trading was continued because the Chairman's position
remained uncertain, but also because the Stock Exchange was wor-
ried about failures to notify dealings in the company's shares and
about whether adequate financial information about the company
had been made available to the market."0
4.1 Inadequate Information
The justification for many share suspensions appears to be the
desire to protect uninformed investors from insiders where the
market price of the investment should be affected by some infor-
mation that has not yet been disclosed to the market as a whole.81
Impending transactions provide an example of circumstances
where the unavailability of adequate information to the market re-
sults in a suspension of trading. For example, in one case, trading
was suspended where the company intended to make a tender of-
fer for its own shares and resumed when the offer was an-
nounced. 2  However, suspensions also occur where there is
78 See, e.g., Hopewell & Schwartz, supra note 45, at 1355.
79 See Lee et al., supra note 4, at 191.
80 See R v. International Stock Exchange of the U.K. and the Republic of Ir. ex p
Else, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 677, 713 (CA.).
81 See, e.g., Phillip Coggan, Nightmare on Throgmorton Street, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1990, at 26 ("The Stock Exchange argues that suspension prevents informed investors
benefiting at the expense of the majority. The problem is that suspension is the Ex-
change's most powerful weapon; once it has been fired, there is little that can be done
to protect shareholders.").
82 See Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 439, 441 (5th Cir. 1983); cf. James
Buxton, Listing is restored as Bremner meets Stock Exchange demands, FIN. TIMES, June 20,
1990 at 30 (reporting that the listing of shares in Bremner plc was restored following
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"unusual and unexplained" market activity8" and a lack of adequate
and accurate information about the issuer's affairs. s4 The lack of
adequate and accurate information may result from the dissemina-
tion by the issuer of false or misleading information,8 5 from the
issuer's failure to make available information which should be dis-
closed,8 6 or from general uncertainty about the issuer's financial
position.8 7 In the U.S., trading suspensions occur where there are
questions about who controls the issuer, and who are the beneficial
owners of its securities.88 Reports of suspensions in the U.K. regu-
larly refer to a need for "clarification of the company's financial
position "89 or to suggestions that the company is suffering from
financial difficulties.90 In both countries, the unavailability of ade-
the issue of a circular by the company's chairman that met the Stock Exchange's
demands for information about the current state of the company).
83 See, e.g., Order of Suspension of Trading, 47 Fed. Reg. 16,924 (Apr. 20, 1982)
(regarding Safeguard Scientifics, Inc.); Order of Suspension of Trading, 45 Fed. Reg.
55,310 (Aug. 19, 1980) (regarding Electro-Heat Resources Corp.); Order of Suspen-
sion of Trading, 48 Fed. Reg. 9723 (Mar. 8, 1993) (regarding Seiscom Delta, Inc.).
84 See, e.g., Davy v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986) ("By February 1, 1980,
SNG was listed for trading. After two ten-day suspensions for 'unusual and unex-
plained' market activity and a 'lack of adequate and accurate public information
about the [company's] operations and financial condition,' trading in SNG's stock
was suspended indefinitely."); Zurad v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 757 F.2d 129,
132 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that "a flurry of trading in the stock had caused the New
York Stock Exchange to suspend trading twice"); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp.
1046, 1065-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (suspension for unexplained heavy trading).
85 See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 106 (1978); Order of Suspension of Trad-
ing, 53 Fed. Reg. 24,822 (June 30, 1988) (relating to Shabu Gold Mines Ltd.); Order
of Suspension of Trading, 47 Fed. Reg. 34,478 (Aug. 9, 1982) (regarding Goldfield
Deep Mines of Nevada (California)); Order of Suspension of Trading, 47 Fed. Reg.
19,499 (May 5, 1982) (regarding International Metals and Petroleum Corp.).
86 See, e.g., Order of Suspension of Trading, 46 Fed. Reg. 23,363 (Apr. 24, 1981)
(relating to Security America Corp.).
87 See, e.g., Cowan De Groot Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust plc, [1991] B.C.L.C.
1045, 1099 (describing the affairs of the issuer at the time of the suspension as "in a
state of crisis").
88 See, e.g., Order of Suspension of Trading, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,465 (Dec. 24, 1992)
(relating to Sanyo Industries, Inc.); Order of Suspension of Trading, 55 Fed. Reg.
13,347 (Apr. 10, 1990) (regarding Southland Communications, Inc.); Order of Sus-
pension of Trading, 53 Fed. Reg. 27,784 (July 22, 1988) (regarding CTI Technical,
Inc.); Order of Suspension of Trading, 48 Fed. Reg. 9723 (Mar. 8, 1983) (regarding
Seiscom Delta, Inc.).
89 For example, in July 1990, Parkfield Group asked that its shares be suspended
"pending clarification of the company's financial position." Andrew Bolger, Parkfield
halts dealings pending finance statement, FIN. TrMES, July 19, 1990, at 22 ("City analysts
immediately speculated that the next step must be to call in the administrators to the
company, which employs more than 4000 people. One commented: 'If Parkfield did
not have a liquidity problem before the share price crash, it certainly did then."').
90 The shares in Associated-Henriques were suspended on July 17, 1990, after the
company said it was suffering from cash flow problems because of overdue payments
by some of its clients. The company was negotiating with its bankers about refinanc-
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quate information to investors and potential investors to enable
them to value the company's shares is believed to justify the sus-
pension. If there is some danger that there has been a leak of in-
formation, it may be thought to be desirable to protect those who
do not have access to this information from those who do.9 1
In the U.K, where suspensions occur because of the inade-
quacy of the information available to the market, it is common for
the Stock Exchange to require the issuer to provide information
before the suspension is lifted. In 1990, for example, the Stock
Exchange offered to restore the listing of Bremner plc pending the
publication of a circular approved by the Stock Exchange to share-
holders in the company and the holding of an extraordinary gen-
eral meeting of shareholders of the company.92
A lack of adequate and accurate information relevant to the
value of securities listed on anexchange is contrary to the rhetoric
of the fairness of the securities markets. This lack of information
would be remediable by the provision of adequate and accurate
information, but suspension of trading in a security is not the only
possible mechanism for ensuring the provision of this information.
A less costly mechanism" would be for regulatory or exchange au-
thorities to inform the public that, in their belief, the information
ing. See Peter Montagnon, Associated-Henriques suspended, FIN. TIMES, July 18, 1990, at
18. Shares in London United Investments were suspended on March 26, 1990 be-
cause of uncertainties about the company's financial position, and the company's
principal insurance subsidiary was banned by the DTI from taking on any new busi-
ness. See 'Uncertainties' take their toll on LU, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, at 25. Shares in
Ketson Group were suspended on October 18, 1990 after restructuring and on the
appointment of an administrative receiver. See Andrew Hill, Ketson calls on bank to
appoint a receiver, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1990, at 23.
91 But see, e.g., Richard J. Barclay, Comment on Macey, Mitchell & Netter, 74 CORNELL
L. REv. 836, 837 (1989) ("If... many stock price movements are caused by the revela-
tion of private information and not public information, then any restrictions on trade
that encumber the normal flow of information pose a potentially serious concern that
we should deal with.").
92 See Andrew Bolger, Bremner listing may be restored, FIN. TIMES,June 13, 1990, at 22.
The Exchange said that following an appeal to the Committee on Quo-
tations it had been decided that the company's listing could be restored
for the remainder of the period of notice of the EGM following publica-
tion of a circular approved by the Exchange before issue.
.... The committee has required the company to issue such a circular
on or before June 18 and said it must include: the company's current
plans and intentions for its future business activity; the company's pres-
ent financial position and how it is intended to employ its liquid re-
sources; and a statement that the Exchange has reserved the right to
withdraw the company's listing following the EGM.
Id.
93 See infra note 108.
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available about the securities of a particular issuer is not sufficient
to form an accurate view of the value of those securities.
4.2 Fraud
Trading in securities is often suspended where a regulator sus-
pects that a securities offering has involved fraud,94 or where a per-
son involved with the issuer has been accused of insider dealing.
95
When trading is suspended based on accusations of previous in-
sider dealing where investors have already suffered loss, rather
than on market manipulation which continues to have an effect on
the price of the securities, it is difficult to see that the suspension
really protects investors. This category of suspension clearly
merges with that of inadequacy of information relating to particu-
lar securities, and is subject to the same criticisms; disclosure,
rather than suspension, is the appropriate action. But cases where
trading in a security is suspended because of fraud in the past are
often not cases of asymmetric information in the present. What
appears to be occurring in such cases, however, is that the Ex-
change is sending out the message that it takes insider dealing seri-
ously, and individual investors are deprived of access to the market
in order to protect general investor confidence in the market. In-
dividual investors may therefore suffer in the interest of preserving
general investor confidence in the markets. This may promote the
orderliness of the securities markets, but it does not seem to pro-
mote their fairness.
4.3 Noncompliance with Listing Obligations
Suspensions imposed on an issuer by an exchange sometimes
result from the breach by the issuer of the continuing obligations
imposed on it through its quotation on the exchange.96 For exam-
ple, breach of a listing obligation to obtain shareholders' approval
for all purchases in excess of twenty-five percent of net assets may
lead to suspension.97 Companies that sell their only operating as-
94 See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 836 F.2d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 1988); Order of
Suspension of Trading, 53 Fed. Reg. 24,822 (June 30, 1988) (relating to Shabu Gold
Mines Ltd., where the reason for the suspension was "the circulation of a prospectus
containing apparently false and misleading information concerning the company's
ownership and assets and the omission of the material information that the Alberta
Securities Commission ordered the suspension of trading, an order which remains in
effect, of the company's securities on the Alberta Stock Exchange").
95 See R v. International Stock Exchange of the U.K. and the Republic of Ir. ex p
Else, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 677, 713 (CA.).
96 See, e.g., London Stock Exchange, The Listing Rules, supra note 70, at ch. 1, 1 1.5.
97 See Colonnade shares are suspended at 165p, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1990, at 27.
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sets to become "cash" companies will be suspended, because they
no longer meet Stock Exchange requirements.98 Failure to pay the
annual listing fee,99 or failure to seek shareholder approval for the
issuance of securities, 100 may also result in suspension of a listing.
Suspension of trading in the securities of an issuer in breach of its
obligations is the sanction available to the Exchange, but the impo-
sition of this sanction harms the interests of holders of the issuer's
securities who have played no part in the breach and, who, realisti-
cally, are not responsible for the breach. The suspension of trad-
ing in securities in these circumstances could be regarded as fair
on the basis of a model of shareholder governance that bears little
relation to reality. In large publicly-held corporations, however,
most shareholders are not in a position to monitor or control the
actions of the issuer's management. As with suspensions of trading
based on inadequate information in the market, the exchange
could respond to failures to comply with the listing rules by inform-
ing the market so that individual investors could take account of
the noncompliance in making their investment or divestment
decisions.
5.0 USES AND ABUSES OF SUSPENSIONS
Although it is clear that suspensions occur for similar reasons
in different jurisdictions, suspension involves a significant interfer-
ence by regulators or exchange authorities with the operations of
the market and is only one of the control mechanisms available to
those authorities. Exchange officials believe that without their
management, there would be too much volatility in their markets,
98 See, e.g., In Re Samuel Sherman plc, No. 005846 of 1990, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1070,
1074-75. The court noted:
During 1978 the company's freehold manufacturing premises were sold
at a profit of £91,450, and in 1980 premises in Hanover Square-part
being used as offices and showroom and the other part let off-were
sold for £600,000, showing a profit of £436,000 odd. The upshot of
these transactions was three-fold. (1) The company ceased trading. (2)
After paying the creditors the company had about £300,000 surplus
cash. That was its main asset. It did not have other assets of any sub-
stance at that point. (3) The Stock Exchange listing was suspended at
the request of the board in view of the sale of the major asset and run-
ning down of the business.
Id.; see also Nikki Tait, Anglo shares suspended after asset disposal plan revealed, FIN. TIMES,
June 6, 1990, at 23 (concerning the suspension of shares in Anglo on its announce-
ment of plans to sell Anglo Leasing).
99 See R v. International Stock Exchange of the U.K. and the Republic of Ir. ex p
Else, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 677, 713 (CA.).
100 See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
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transactions would be consummated on the basis of inadequate, or
at least asymmetric, information, and fraud would be rampant. Ac-
tion to combat these evils bolsters an exchange's reputation and
allows it to compete effectively with other exchanges, 10 1 but, gener-
ally, exchange markets are probably too managed. 10 2 The twenti-
eth century has seen a dramatic increase in the level of
management of exchange activity, through changes initiated by ex-
changes themselves or in response to outside pressure from regula-
tory authorities such as the SEC and from politicians. 10 3  Each
crash and each fraud unearthed gives rise to new pressure for new
rules, but this does not mean that the new rules are always desira-
ble. At times, the original objectives of the regulatory system are
obscured: a system designed primarily to inform investors about
investment products begins to look more like a system of merit reg-
ulation, protecting investors from the dangers of investing in un-
suitable investment products. 10 4  The more regulators and
exchanges do to manage the markets, particularly through sus-
pending trading in securities, the less credible are their claims that
they are not involved in merit regulation.
For exchanges, the decision whether to suspend trading in a
particular security may involve a conflict between the objectives of
maintaining a liquid (but not too volatile) market for investors10 5
and allowing all investors an opportunity to evaluate news an-
nouncements.1 0 6 Trading halts or suspensions are not costless: the
101 See Macey & Kanda, supra note 43, at 1023 ("[Tlhe loss to the exchange's
reputational capital resulting from a false declaration of quality inevitably will exceed
any short term gains the exchange might obtain by making such a false declaration.").
102 Suspension of trading in securities has been a technique implemented by ex-
changes since the nineteenth century and has, as a result probably been subjected to
less scrutiny than some more recently developed techniques.
103 See generally ROBERT SOBEL, AMEX-A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN STOCK Ex-
CHANGE, 1921-1971 (1972) (examining the changing levels of regulation at the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange).
104 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden
on Commerce?, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 105, 114 (1987) (maintaining that "despite the selec-
tion of disclosure over substantive regulation in the Securities Act, the SEC could well
exercise merit regulation under the authority given to it by Congress to establish a
national market system"); see generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, Legitimacy in the
Securities Industry: The Role of Merit Regulation, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 129 (1987) (state
merit regulation); Ad Hoc Committee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of
Securities, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAw. 785 (1986)
(same).
105 Stock exchanges provide liquidity, monitoring, standard form contracts, and
reputational capital. See Macey & Kanda, supra note 43, at 1012, 1018-1024.
106 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-22554, 50 Fed. Reg. 43,825
(Oct. 29, 1985) (concerning a proposed rule change relating to trading halt
procedures).
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suspension of trading in a security temporarily reduces liquidity
and imposes opportunity losses and gains on those who would have
traded during the period of the suspension had they been able to
do so.' 0 7 Long suspensions of trading are likely to produce greater
costs than short suspensions.1°8 Those affected include holders of
the suspended security, those who would have acquired the sus-
pended security but for the suspension, and those who would have
traded in derivative instruments based on the suspended security
but for the suspension." 9
Cost-benefit analysis is now an accepted element in the
rulemaking process adopted in the U.S. and the U.K., and it could
easily be extended to non-rulemaking action by regulators and ex-
changes. If the gains produced by a suspension exceed the costs
imposed by it, there is no reason to criticize the suspension. It is
not evident, however, that this calculation forms any part of the
decision process of those who have the power to order suspensions
of trading in securities. The cost-benefit calculation as applied to
the suspension decision should weigh the benefits of improving
the dissemination of information, of applying sanctions for wrong-
doing, and of reducing volatility and maintaining the confidence
107 Hopewell & Schwartz, supra note 45, at 1357. The authors further suggest that
the "[olperational criteria for evaluating these costs and decision rules which would
insure equitable suspensions are not obvious and may not exist. Thus, the relative
costs and benefits of suspension in imbalance situations appear to depend upon the
judgment exercised." Id.
108 The London Stock Exchange has imposed suspensions of trading for periods of
some years. See, e.g., Dep't of Trade & Indus., Aldermanbury Trust plc Investigation under
Section 432(2) of the Companies Act 1985, Report by George Warren Staple & Thomas
Gregory James Tress FCA, 1 2.06, at 11 (HMSO 1991) (recording suspension of the
company's shares in March 1976 and the continuation of the suspension until the
listing was cancelled in January 1988).
109 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-26382, 53 Fed. Reg.
52,539 (Dec. 21, 1988) (proposing rule changes regarding trading rotations, halts,
and suspensions relating to options on a stock index group on AMEX; circumstances
when trading may be suspended include "other unusual conditions or circumstances
detrimental to the maintenance of a fair and orderly market"); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Release No. 34-26709, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,280 (Apr. 11, 1989) (approving
proposed rule changes relating to halts or suspensions of trading in index participa-
tions on AMEX and the CBOT); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-
27382, 54 Fed. Reg. 45,834 (Oct. 31, 1989) (noting that the effect of an SEC-ordered
suspension of trading in a basket component stock would be to preclude trading in
the basket); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-35789, 60 Fed. Reg.
30,127 (June 7, 1995) (regarding self-regulatory organizations; order approving pro-
posed rule changes and notice of filing and order granting accelerated approval of
amendment numbers one, two, and three to the proposed rule changes by the Chi-
cago Board Options Exchange, Inc., relating to trading halts, trading suspensions, the
re-opening of trading after a trading halt or suspension, and the suspension of the
retail automatic execution system).
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of investors that the market is a fair and orderly place in which to
transact against the costs of reduced liquidity and the harm to in-
vestor confidence in the market. Moreover, the suspension calcu-
lation should not be carried out in a vacuum. The costs and
benefits of alternative mechanisms to achieve the desired objective
should also be measured. If the regulator or exchange has a
choice between different actions to achieve the same objective, it
should choose the action that is least costly for those affected by it.
If disclosure is a practical solution to the perceived problem, it will
usually also be the less costly and, therefore, preferable solution.
Clearly, the rules adopted by exchange authorities are rarely,
if ever, the only solution to a perceived problem. In 1964, George
Stigler suggested an alternative to the NYSE's practice of sus-
pending trading in situations of order imbalances:
The popular NYSE practice of suspending trading until buy and
sell orders can be matched at a "reasonable" price is open to
serious objection. To prevent a trade is no function of the ex-
change, and any defense must lie in a desire to avoid "unneces-
sary" price fluctuations. An unnecessary price fluctuation is
surely one not called for by the conditions of supply and de-
mand of the week even though the fluctuation may reflect supply
and demand of the hour. This suspension of trading means that
the exchange officials know the correct price change when
there is a flood of buy or sell orders. We need not pause to
inquire where they get this clairvoyance; it is enough to notice
that the correct way to iron out the unnecessary wrinkles in the
price chart is to speculate: to buy or sell against the unnecessary
movement. The omniscient officials should be deprived of the
power to suspend trading but given vast sums to speculate.' 10
This proposed solution is unlikely to appeal to exchange officials,
but Stigler is surely right in suggesting that exchange officials
would need to be clairvoyant to work out what the correct price
change for a particular security should be. However, we should
note that the NYSE is not alone among exchanges in trying to en-
sure the maintenance of what exchange officials regard as a "fair
and orderly market," which involves an assessment of the correct
price of a security.1 11
Where the reason for the suspension of trading is that the
110 George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 130
(1964).
111 See R v. International Stock Exchange of the U.K. & The Republic of Ir. ex p
Else, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 677 (Q.B.D.). In this case, members of the Committee on
Quotations responsible for delisting an issuer's shares gave evidence that, in their
view, the state of the issuer's accounts meant that there could be no orderly market in
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market is insufficiently informed about matters relevant to the
value of the security in question, there is a similar problem of bal-
ancing the costs of insufficient information against those of
nonmarketability. 112 In SEC v. Sloan,113 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that suspension of trading in a security might be harmful to
the issuer itself, and to its shareholders and to other investors. The
Court also suggested that disclosure might be an appropriate
method of dealing with the problem of inadequate information in
the market.
114
Suspensions attributed to order imbalances are very tempo-
rary, as generally are suspensions pending announcements of sig-
nificant news. The costs imposed by these suspensions are,
therefore, limited. On the other hand, it is clear that the costs of
suspensions which last for years are much greater.115
The way in which decisions about suspensions are made may
contribute to the problem. Persons whose own interests may be
promoted by a suspension, or by the continuation of a suspension,
are more likely to be able to influence the suspension decision
than those who are likely to be affected adversely by the suspen-
sion. Specialists have more influence over suspension decisions
than do investors.' 16 Suspensions of dealings in securities often
take place at the request of the issuer's management, 1 17 rather
its shares, and that normal and regular dealings in the shares would be impossible.
Id. at 684-86.
112 See Hopewell & Schwartz, supra note 45 at 1358.
113 435 U.S. 103 (1978).
114 Id. at 116 ("Even assuming that it is proper to suspend trading simply in order to
enhance the information in the marketplace, there is nothing to indicate that the
Commission cannot simply reveal to the investing public at the end of 10 days the
reasons which it thought justified the initial summary suspension and then let the
investors make their own judgments.").
115 See Coggan, supra note 82, at 26 (referring to the suspension of shares in Falcon
Resources in October, 1985).
116 Hopewell & Schwartz, supra note 45, at 1358-59 ("It is worth noting that
whatever complex factors determine the specialist's incentives, it seems unlikely that
his interests would coincide with an optimal balance between the equity costs and
benefits of suspension."). On the influence of specialists at the NYSE, see generally
Blume et al., supra note 15, at 48; cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-
26173, 53 Fed. Reg. 40,809 (Oct. 18, 1988) (approving temporary NASD rule change
to protect Small Order Execution System (SOES) market makers, noting: "[W] here
quotations in a security are changing and where the company has released material
news, but trading has not been halted in its security.., abusive activity is resulting in
substantial lost revenue incurred daily by SOES market makers who are limited in
their ability to withdraw from SOES.").
117 See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Equities v. Goodman, [1991] B.C.L.C. 897, 918; In Re
Samuel Sherman plc, No 005846 of 1990, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1070, 1074-75; see also Dep't
of Trade & Indus., Sound Diffusion pie. Investigation under section 432(2) of the Companies
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than being imposed on the issuer, and investors in it, by the stock
exchange itself. But a company's management may not have the
best interests of the company's shareholders at heart, and may be
promoting the idea of suspension in order to forestall potential
takeovers that could threaten its position. The company's brokers
may also have their own reasons for wanting a suspension; they may
wish to prevent the share price from falling to protect the "value"
of their own holdings. Reliance by exchanges and regulators on
managements as initiators of suspensions does not guarantee that
suspensions occur promptly and may also contribute to another
undesirable phenomenon: that trading in the securities of one is-
suer may be suspended while another issuer in what appears to be
a comparable position finds that trading in its securities is unim-
peded."' Surely, in a "fair and orderly market," similar situations
should be treated similarly.
Of the costs imposed by suspensions, the most significant are
those imposed on shareholders of the suspended issuer who are
deprived by the suspension of a market for their securities, and
locked in to the issuer. Judges have recognized that shareholders'
interests are adversely affected by suspensions: in the U.K., Sir
Thomas Bingham M. R. has said: "I accept without question that
Act 1985, Report by Edmund James Lawson QC and David Anton FCA, 11 1.1, 9.20
(HMSO 1991) [hereinafter Lawson & Anton]. The authors of the investigative report
stated:
In our view it was entirely justified for the directors to have decided on
the morning of 5 December 1988 that at the very least the Company's
.share listing on The Stock Exchange had to be suspended. At that time
the Company had a market capitalisation ofjust over £40 million. Given
the Company's financial difficulties this was an overstatement of its true
worth and accordingly a continuance of the listing would have led to a
false market in the shares. This was the substance of the advice given by
Mr. Lithiby of Panmure Gordon, the Company's brokers.
Lawson & Anton, supra, at 1 9.20.
118 On the Stock Exchange's functions, see Dep't of Trade & Indus., Rotaprint plc-
Investigation under Section 432(2) and Section 442 of the Companies Act 1985, Report by
Mary Howarth Arden QC & Geoffrey Newton Lane FCA, at 1 10.23 (HMSO 1991).
The authors noted:
In the course of our investigation we considered whether it was any part
of the functions normally performed by The Stock Exchange to bring to
a halt dealings in shares where, as in the case of Rotaprint, the share
price has ceased to bear any rational relationship to the company's own
view of its assets or prospects. So far as we can ascertain this is no part
of the functions currently performed by The Stock Exchange. Indeed
The Stock Exchange would be unable in most cases to determine
whether a share was overvalued since it is not in possession of full finan-
cial information about a company.
Id.; see also id. 10.25 (suggesting that the Stock Exchange's monitoring of the
Rotaprint share price was inadequate).
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shareholders such as the applicants are liable to suffer loss or prej-
udice if the public listing of a company in which they hold shares is
cancelled. But so they may if the listing is suspended or, in a less
obvious way, if an application for listing is refused."1 19 In SEC v.
Sloan, the United States Supreme Court said that "the power to
summarily suspend trading in a security even for 10 days, without
any notice, opportunity to be heard, or findings based upon a rec-
ord, is an awesome power with a potentially devastating impact on
the issuer, its shareholders, and other investors."120  However,
although it is accepted that shareholders may suffer loss as a result
of a suspension, shareholders have no role when exchange authori-
ties suspend trading in their shares.
The London Stock Exchange has opposed the idea of consult-
ing shareholders about a proposed delisting or suspension because
of the costs and administrative inconvenience this would involve
and because time delays caused by consultation could harm the
business interests of the issuer. 121 The Stock Exchange argues that
shareholders who oppose a delisting or suspension should bring
pressure to bear on the company's directors to apply for relisting
or lifting of the suspension, rather than putting their views directly
to the Exchange's Committee on Quotations. 22 The Court of Ap-
peal found that shareholders do not have the right either to ap-
pear before the Committee on Quotations in relation to a possible
119 See R v. International Stock Exchange of the U.K and the Republic of Ir. ex p
Else, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 677, 713 (CA.).
120 SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 112 (1978).
121 See R v. International Stock Exchange of the U.K. and The Republic of Ir. ex p
Else, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 677, 697 (Q.B.D.).
It is said that the competent authority would on occasions have to evalu-
ate, reconcile and adjudicate between a possible multitude of differing
views and that the identities of shareholders and their views would be
continually changing as the shares were traded. The requirement to
consult could be detrimental to the business interests of the company
because, for instance, of time delays which would inevitably result from
consultation; uncertainty affecting the decision-making process where
shareholders' views differed from those of the company; and because
confidential information given to the authority to enable it to come to
an informed decision might have to be disclosed to shareholders which
might be in breach of the Financial Services Act.
Id. The Stock Exchange also argued that "if shareholders were alleged to have a suffi-
cient interest, others such as banks who grant loans on the security of shares or per-
sons interested in acquiring shares at the time of listing could similarly have sufficient
standing." Id.
122 Id. It is difficult to imagine that shareholders in a company whose shares are
suspended are likely to be able to influence management to take the action necessary
for the suspension to be ended.
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suspension or delisting or to apply for judicial review of a decision
by the Committee to delist or suspend a security.
It is not only in relation to the loss of a market for their shares
that shareholders of suspended issuers may suffer loss. Creditors of
the issuer may react to the suspension by deciding to withdraw
credit. 23 Although the suspension of trading in a company's
shares is not a common event of default in loan agreements, and a
lender is likely to be reluctant to test in the courts whether a mate-
rial adverse change clause is breached by a suspension, many com-
panies rely heavily on uncommitted funds, such as overdraft
facilities, to finance their operations. Polly Peck, a company whose
shares were suspended in the U.K. in 1990, seems to have had
about eighteen percent of its financing in uncommitted funds.1 24
Many companies are technically insolvent and the withdrawal of
uncommitted funds by a creditor can have a dramatic impact on a
company's financial position, pushing it into bankruptcy or, at
least, Chapter 11 reorganization or administration proceedings.' 25
Liquidations are expensive and often do not return much capital
to shareholders.
26
5.1 Do Suspensions Work?
Suspensions of trading in securities do impose costs on market
participants, but these costs are limited by the difficulties regula-
tors and exchanges face in ensuring that suspensions work. Where
an exchange suspends trading in a security, transactions may some-
times be effected off-exchange 127 or on another exchange where
123 SeeLawson & Anton, supra note 118, at 174, 8.60. Lawson & Anton noted that:
The possibility of suspending the Company's listing on the Stock Ex-
change was discussed. It was considered that the Company's shares were
over valued and therefore there was a false market in them. However,
Kleinwort Benson considered that suspension would precipitate a re-
ceivership and advised that further work should be performed on a busi-
ness plan over the coming weekend and that the Bank of Scotland's
attitude should be clarified.
Id.
124 See Nadir looks to Turkey for breathing spacA FIN. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1990, at 32.
125 Although, for a suggestion that individual creditors have incentives not to initi-
ate bankruptcy, see Douglas Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 Int'l. Rev. L.
& Econ. 223, 224 (1991).
126 See generally Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of
Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990) (discussing the costs of bankruptcy).
The costs of private renegotiation may be lower than those of formal procedures such
as those of Chapterll or bankruptcy. See Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled Debt Restruc-
turings - An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
315, 319 (1990).
127 NASD members are allowed to continue to trade in securities during trading
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trading is not suspended. Even a regulator seeking to suspend or
delay trading in securities within its own jurisdiction may not be
successful. 128 Regulators and exchanges encounter difficulties in
making trading suspensions effective where trades may be carried
out on foreign exchanges. During the suspension of trading in
Polly Peck shares in the U.K., there were reports of trading in the
shares despite the suspension. Trades happened in two ways:
through individuals approaching institutions and large private in-
vestors, and through trading in Zurich where the shares were also
quoted. These transactions consequently pushed the share price
up. 129 At the time, Polly Peck's serious financial difficulties were
well publicized, but there was still investor interest in the shares. In
one U.K. case shareholders challenging the delisting of a company
had acquired their shares off-market while the shares were sus-
pended and before they were delisted.13 1 If the function of suspen-
sions is to maintain investor confidence in a particular exchange
market, it may not matter that such transactions occur. The
London Stock Exchange, by suspending trading in a security that
may freely be traded in Zurich, may be signaling that it operates a
more strictly controlled market than that in Zurich, thereby pro-
moting higher levels of investor confidence in its market."'
Where the perceived objective of suspensions is not to im-
prove the competitive position of a particular exchange through
halts or suspensions initiated by an exchange, unless the NASD itself halts trading in
the security. See NASD Manual, supra note 51, at 1 1920; see generally Therese H. May-
nard, What is an "Exchange"?-Proprietay Electronic Securities Trading Systems and the Stat-
utory Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 833 (1992) (discussing
proprietary trading systems that compete with exchanges); Lewis D. Solomon & Lou-
ise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of Securities: The Emerging Global Market
and the Implications for Regulation, 24 MARsHALL L. REV. 299, 320-27 (1991) (same).
128 See Markey Seeks Report on Failure to Comply With Delayed Trading Request, 26 Sec.
Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 474 (Apr. 1, 1994). The action in question was not
a suspension of trading under section 781(k) of the 1934 Act, but a request to delay
trading in Mexican securities after the assassination of Luis Colosia. See Levitt Cites
"Logistical" Problems in Trying to Delay Trading Opening, 26 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA)
No. 20, at 731 (May 20, 1994).
129 See Robert Waters & AndrewJack, Buying spree in Polly Peck shares, FIN. TIMES, May
3, 1991, at 19.
130 See R v. International Stock Exchange of the U.K. and the Republic of Ir. ex p
Else, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 677, 714 (CA.).
131 The London Stock Exchange has produced marketing literature for a listing in
London as a product that can ensure investor confidence. See, e.g., THE INTERNA-
TIONAL STOCK ExCHANGE, A LISTING IN LONDON (Nov. 1987); cf Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 268 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[I] nvestors rely heavily upon
the rules of the NYSE to insure fair dealing in corporate matters. Indeed, the fact that
Norlin stock continues to be traded on NASDAQ even while it is suspended on the
NYSE suggests that this investor confidence may be well placed.").
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the imposition of higher regulatory standards, but to ensure that
trading in a particular security is halted, additional rules will apply
to ensure the effectiveness of suspensions. At the domestic level,
the number of trades in suspended securities can be reduced by
rules prohibiting regulated market participants from facilitating or
participating in transactions in such securities.
Where securities are listed on more than one exchange in dif-
ferent jurisdictions, or may be traded through the facilities of a
foreign exchange where they are not listed, a suspension of trading
in the securities by one exchange, or even by a regulatory body
such as the SEC, will not necessarily be effective to prevent trading
in the securities. In some circumstances where one exchange sus-
pends trading, other exchanges also have an incentive to suspend
trading if, for example, those exchanges wish to be seen as markets
with high regulatory standards. However, as the Polly Peck exam-
ple illustrates,13 2 the suspension of trading in a security in one mar-
ket does not always result in the suspension of trading in that
security in other markets concerned. The SEC has suggested that
such "erosion of trading halts . .. could affect the integrity of the
United States securities markets.""'3
In practice, securities markets in different jurisdictions have
cooperated in ensuring the effectiveness of suspensions. For exam-
ple, in 1987, the NASD stated that the London Stock Exchange
would cooperate with it in relation to "suspensions and resumption
of trading, and the surveillance and investigation of trading in se-
curities of mutual market concern."1 3 4 Exchanges have also set up
more formal arrangements for cooperation: the plan for a market
linkage between AMEX and the Toronto Stock Exchange provided
for coordination of actions by the two exchanges in relation to
trading halts in dually-listed securities.1 3 5 Within the EC, there is a
system to allow for consultation between regulators of listings.
1 3
1
Such arrangements all contribute to promoting the effectiveness of
trading halts or suspensions, but cannot ensure the effectiveness of
such actions in circumstances where there are no preexisting ar-
132 See supra note 130.
133 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-21958, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302,
16,309 (Apr. 18, 1985).
134 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-24979, 52 Fed. Reg. 37,684,
37,686 (Oct. 2, 1987).
135 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-22442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201,
39,201-03 (Sept. 27, 1985); cf Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-25457,
53 Fed. Reg. 9156 (Mar. 21, 1988) (approving a proposed rule change regarding a
pilot program for cooperation between NASD and Stock Exchange of Singapore).
136 See Admissions Directive, supra note 54, at Article 20.
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rangements between the markets in question, no multilateral ar-
rangements for harmonization of the control of market activity, or
no willingness to cooperate. If investors wish to trade in suspended
securities, a market has an incentive to provide facilities for their
trades.
6.0 MARKETS AND REGULATORS
6.1 Limitations on the Right to Suspend
Exchanges and regulatory bodies such as the SEC have consid-
erable discretion as to when and whether to suspend or halt trad-
ing in securities, and they tend to give little information to the
public about the reasons for their decisions. A decision to suspend
trading in a security may have an adverse impact on those pre-
cluded by the suspension from transacting in that security. People
who are adversely affected by a suspension decision, however, may
not be able to challenge that decision or obtain a remedy for any
loss they incur as a result.
In the U.S. and the U.K. there are limited opportunities for
review by the courts of decisions to suspend trading in securities.
Despite the successful challenge of the SEC's use of its summary
suspension power in SEC v. Sloan, the deferential standard of re-
view suggests that challenges are generally unlikely to succeed.
137
U.K. law imposes few controls on the exercise of power by regula-
tory bodies and commonly excludes such bodies from liability for
their actions.13 1 Courts in the U.K. are unwilling to quash deci-
137 See supra note 33.
138 See, e.g., Mental Health Act 1983, § 139(1) (Eng.). The Act reads, in part:
No person shall be liable, whether on the ground of want ofjurisdiction
or on any other ground, to any civil or criminal proceedings to which
he would have been liable apart from this section in respect of any act
purporting to be done in pursuance of this Act or any regulations or
rules made under this Act, or in, or in pursuance of anything done in,
the discharge of functions conferred by any other enactment on the
authority having jurisdiction under Part VII of this Act, unless the act
was done in bad faith or without reasonable care.
Id. § 139(1); cf Public Health Act 1875, § 265 (Eng.) [hereinafter Public Health Act].
The Public Health Act reads, in part:
No matter or thing done, and no contract entered into by any local
authority ... and no matter or thing done by any member.., or by any
officer of such authority or other person whomsoever acting under the
direction of such authority shall, if the matter or thing were done or the
contract were entered into bona fide for the purpose of executing this
Act, subject them or any of them personally to any action liability claim
or demand whatsoever; and any expense incurred by any such authority
member officer or other person acting as last aforesaid shall be borne
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sions of regulatory bodies, particularly decisions relating to com-
mercial matters."3 9 Shareholders do not even have standing to
challenge a decision to suspend or delist a company's securities.
Only the issuer may bring such a challenge before the courts.14
It is clear that, in the U.K., a person who feels that her inter-
ests have been prejudiced by the Stock Exchange's power to sus-
pend would not be able to claim damages for any economic loss
sustained as a result of the suspension.' 41 The Financial Services
Act effectively precludes shareholders from obtaining compensa-
tion from the Stock Exchange.
Nor are shareholders who suffered a financial loss as a result
of the suspension of trading in their shares likely to be able to ob-
tain any remedy from the management of the company for the loss
they incurred, even where they can show that management both
created the conditions for suspension and asked for the suspen-
sion. Before the Companies Act of 1989,142 shareholders were un-
able to obtain remedies in damages against their companies,
14 3
although commentators differed in their analyses of the basis for
this inability."4 The Companies Act of 1989 removed the preexist-
and repaid out of the fund or rate applicable by such authority to the
general purposes of this Act.
Public Health Act, supra, § 265.
3s9 See generally Sir Harry Woolf, Judicial Review in the Commercial Arena, 8 COMPANY
LAw. 167 (1987).
140 See R v. International Stock Exchange of the U.K. and the Republic of Ir. ex p
Else, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 677, 720-22 (CA.).
141 The Financial Services Act of 1986 provides:
Neither the competent authority nor any member, officer, or servant of
that authority shall be liable in damages for anything done or omitted
in the discharge or purported discharge of any functions of the author-
ity under Part IV of this Act unless the act or omission is shown to have
been in bad faith.
Financial Services Act, supra note 21, § 187(4). For discussion of this provision in the
House of Commons, see Hansard, June 11, 1986, at cols. 402-25. The Minister,
Michael Howard, suggested that the provision was necessary to enable regulatory bod-
ies to act effectively, without worrying about potential liability. See Hansard at cols.
403-05. Bryan Gould stated: "Under the provision we are confronted with self-regula-
tion on the bad old model where self-regulation is undertaken by groups or profes-
sional cliques whose real purpose is to defend the interests of their own members
against the outside public." Id. at col. 410.
142 Companies Act 1989, ch. 40 (Eng.).
143 See Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, (1880) 5 App. Cas. 317 (H.L.) (disal-
lowing shareholders' remedies for damages against their companies).
144 See L.C.B. Gower, Contract-Sale of Goods-Innocent Misrepresentations and Condi-
tions, 13 MOD. L. REv. 362, 367 n.8 (1950) ("The judgments appear to show a confu-
sion between the corporate company and its members and the reasoning is
unsatisfactory. The decision would doubtless be followed but the principle is clearly
limited to cases of share subscriptions and perhaps partnership contracts. In the case
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ing disability of shareholders to claim damages against their com-
panies; just as the precise limits of the disability were unclear,
however, so are those of the new ability to claim damages. One
distinguished judge has stated that: "One of the interests of a share-
holder is in being able to sell his shares at the best price and if he is
prevented from doing so, it seems to me that he has been
prejudiced in his interests as a member."45 This does not mean
that a shareholder prevented from selling his shares by a suspen-
sion of trading will be able to obtain a remedy. The loss of liquidity
would be reflected in a reduction in the value of the shares. As a
general matter, the English courts tend to see reduction in the
value of shares as a reflection of a loss to the company rather than
as a loss to the shareholder'46 and, although the action by the di-
rectors that caused loss to a shareholder by preventing the share-
holder from selling her shares could be characterized as a personal
loss to the shareholder, it is not obvious that the courts would ac-
cept this characterization. It is unusual for shareholders of publicly
held companies in England to succeed in actions for breaches of
directors' duties.
In the U.S., the business judgment rule often shields corpo-
rate managements from liability for their actions. 147 However, an
illegality such as a breach of the securities laws could give rise to
liability for breach of the directors' and officers' duty of care. 4
This liability might exist even where the statutory provision estab-
lishing the illegality did not give rise to an express or implied pri-
vate right of action.
49
of other contracts it is clear that damages are recoverable irrespective of rescission.");
cf JA. Hornby, Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, 19 MOD. L. REv. 54 (1956);
K.W. Wedderburn, Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle, (1957] CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 194, 211.
145 In re A Company, [1986] B.C.L.C. 382, 387 (per Hoffman, J., as he then was).
Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 provides for a remedy for shareholders who
suffer from unfairly prejudicial conduct. After the Companies Act 1989, a share-
holder may succeed in an action under section 459 even if all shareholders were af-
fected by the conduct in question.
146 See, e.g., Prudential Assurance v. Newman Indus., [1982] Ch. 204 (CA).
147 See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 8.30 (Supp. 1995); AMERICAN
LAw INsTrruTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, § 4.01 (1994); see generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of
Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FoRDHAm L. Rv. 437 (1993);
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided No-
tion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 287 (1994).
148 See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762-63 (3rd Cir. 1974).
149 See Cort v Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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6.2 The Relationship Between Markets and Regulators in the U.S. and
UK. Compared
In both the U.S. and the U.K., 150 the exchanges have a signifi-
cant impact on the rules that regulate activity on those exchanges.
In the U.K, the Stock Exchange is the body responsible, under
statute, 51 for regulating the listing of securities, subject to the
power of the Secretary of State to withdraw this responsibility from
it in certain circumstances.1 52 As a recognized investment ex-
change, the Stock Exchange is also subject to the control of the
Securities and Investments Board in certain respects. 15 3 The Finan-
cial Services Act of 1986 sets out various requirements that must be
satisfied before an exchange may be recognized. For example, the
Exchange must have adequate financial resources,1 5 4 and its rules
and practices must ensure that exchange activity is carried out in
an orderly manner and that investors are properly protected.155 In
addition, the Exchange must only allow dealings in investments in
which there is "a proper market" and require the provision of the
proper information for determining the current value of invest-
ments; 56 there must also be arrangements for clearing and record-
ing transactions and systems for monitoring and enforcement of
compliance with the Exchange's rules and for the investigation of
complaints.157 The Exchange must also be "able and willing to
150 On comparison of regulatory styles in the U.S. and the U.K., see Keith Hawkins,
Rule and Discretion in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Social Regulation, 50 Ohio St. L.
J. 663, 665-66 (1989), where the author identifies three themes: the balance between
rule and discretion; the formality and legalism of U.S. regulatory processes compared
with European counterparts; and the degree of stringency, legalism, or punitiveness
with which rules are implemented in America. See Deborah A. DeMott, Comparative
Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 69 (1987); Thomas Hurst, The
Regulation of Tender Offers in the United States and the United Kingdom: Self-Regulation ver-
sus Legal Regulation, 12 N.C.J. INT'L. & COM. REG. 389 (1987); cf GRANr Gn-MoRE, THE
AGES OF AMEpiCAN LAw 11 (1977) ("[O]ur system was, from the beginning, con-
sciously designed as a sort of formal garden instead of being allowed to come up as it
might from the compost heap of the centuries.").
151 See, e.g., James J. Fishman, Enforcement of Securities Laws Violations in the United
Kingdom, 9 INT'L. TAX & Bus. LAw. 131, 205 (1991) (explaining the change in the
U.K. from informal to formal regulation of financial matters and comparing the U.K.
system unfavorably with that in the U.S.).
152 The Stock Exchange is also regulated as a recognized investment exchange
under the Financial Services Act 1986.
153 Recognized Investment Exchanges do not need to be authorized to carry on
investment business in the U.K. See Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 21, §§ 36-
39.
154 Id. at Schedule 4, 1.
155 Id. at Schedule 4, 2(1).
156 Id. at Schedule 4, 2(2).
157 Id. at Schedule 4, 2(4), 2(5), 3 and 4.
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promote and maintain high standards of integrity and fair dealing"
and to cooperate with regulators. 58
The London Stock Exchange is subject to some control by the
Treasury and by the Securities and Investments Board (SIB), but
there are no formal structures for approval by the Treasury of the
rules of an investment exchange, including the London Stock Ex-
change, after it becomes a recognized investment exchange. In the
past, the Exchange, as a private body, adopted rules in a relatively
informal manner; there is still less formality than with other regula-
tory bodies, such as the SIB (another private law body with public
powers), but there is also an increased juridification 59 of what the
Exchange does.1 6' The Exchange is subject to the threat ofjudicial
review and now engages in consultation about proposed changes
to its rules.
1 6 1
In the U.K., suspensions are imposed to ensure an orderly
market or to prevent a false market. The Stock Exchange is not so
concerned about volatility, although the Exchange does at times
declare a fast market to protect market makers in relation to the
price at which they have to deal.' 62 The U.K. authorities do not
believe that it is part of their job to bolster the market or to manip-
ulate or distort market conditions,16 but the London Stock Ex-
158 Id. at Schedule 4, 5.
159 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of theJuridical Field (Rich-
ard Terdiman, trans.), 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 835-37 (1987) (concerningjuridification,
the process whereby activities and relationships which have been regulated outside
the legal system become regulated through the legal system).
160 See, e.g., L.C.B. Gower, Big Bang and City Regulation, 51 MOD. L. REv. 1, 9 (1988)
(stating that the "Stock Exchange was about to be recognised as the 'competent au-
thority' for the purposes of those directives, thus completing its transformation from
a private club to a public body").
161 See generally London Stock Exchange, The Listing Rules, supra note 70; London
Stock Exchange, Commentary on Consultation Draft of the Listing Rules and Table of Desti-
nation. The term 'judicial review" in English law refers to the review by the courts of
quasi-judicial decisions of public authorities. See e.g., Lord Alexander of Weedon,
Judicial Review and City Regulators, 52 MOD. L. REv. 640 (1989) (examining the impact
ofjudicial review on U.K. regulators); Lord Alexander of Weedon, Takeovers: The Regu-
latory Scene, 1990 J. Bus. L. 203, 212-15 (1990) (same); Jeffrey Jowell, The Takeover
Panel: Autonomy, Flexibility and Legality, 1991 PuB. L. 149 (1991) (same); Woolf, supra
note 140 (same).
162 A fast market is one in which market makers are not obliged to deal at quoted
prices. See Christine Buckley, London Stock Exchange: Equity futures and options trading,
FIN. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at 42; Terry Byland, London Stock Exchange: Gains reversed
following Federal Reserve move-Market report, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at 42.
163 See Securities and Investments Board, Regulation of the UK Equity Markets:
Report by the Securities and Investments Board, 2.4 (1995). The report notes:
[T] he trading process should be determined primarily by market forces;
these will include factors such as innovation by intermediaries, increas-
ing technological capability, and pressure from investors. It should be
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change has an interest in attracting and keeping business. The
London Stock Exchange has more freedom to impose suspensions
or halts than the SEC and there are no statutory limitations on its
power to prohibit dealings in securities.164
The U.K. rules were modeled on the U.S. approach to the con-
trol of securities exchanges and self-regulatory organizations. In
the U.S., exchanges are subject to the control of the SEC, which
has the power to approve or reject rule changes proposed by the
exchanges. As a result of lobbying by Wall Street, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 originally allowed the NYSE to police it-
self.165 The SEC was to oversee regulation by the stock exchanges
rather than to control that regulation. By the time of the 1975
amendments to the securities laws, however, it was clear that the
NYSE's rules helped to perpetuate its monopoly position in the
market for securities trades.166 The SEC now has a mandate to act
to create a National Market System for securities trading, but com-
mentators agree that such a system has not yet been achieved. The
SEC tends to react to proposals for rule changes made by the Self-
Regulating Organizations (SROs) rather than proposing rules as a
matter of its own initiative. It acts like a mediator rather than an
initiator.167 The SEC has continuing powers under statute to re-
view changes in the rules of a securities exchange that the SIB and
Treasury do not have in the U.K. However, just as antitrust con-
cerns led to Mayday and the 1975 securities laws amendments in
the U.S., competition law has been invoked as the basis for changes
for markets, operating within such investor protection measures as are
necessary, to deliver efficiency and to determine what innovation and
adaptation is required to meet changes in user needs.
Id.
164 The Stock Exchange's functions as a listing authority are regulated under the
Financial Services Act, but its other functions are not so controlled. The Stock Ex-
change is a recognized investment exchange under the Financial Services Act, which
means that it is exempt from the Act's authorization requirement for the conducting
of investment business in the U.K. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (ad-
dressing the requirements for recognition of investment exchanges under the Act).
Recognition of an investment exchange may be revoked if the exchange does not
comply with a requirement of Schedule 4, or with any other obligation under the
Financial Services Act. See Financial Services Act, supra note 21, § 37(7). The require-
ments of Schedule 4 of the Act, however, are very general and the Securities and
Investments Board is unlikely to challenge the Stock Exchange's views about when it
is appropriate to prohibit dealings in securities.
165 See BLUME ET AL., supra note 15, at 34.
166 The rules still have this effect to some extent. For example, NASDAQ has ar-
gued that the NYSE's rule 500, which requires shareholder approval for delisting an
issuer's securities from the exchange, prevents transfers of trading in an issuer's secur-
ities from the NYSE to NASDAQ and therefore impedes competition.
167 ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION 86-87 (1992).
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in the rules in the U.K. London's Big Bang in 1986 was like a Brit-
ish Mayday. The Director General of Fair Trading concluded that
the London Stock Exchange's rules distorted competition, and an
equity market review was carried out by the SIB and the London
Stock Exchange. As part of the review, the Stock Exchange agreed
to change its requirements for reporting of trades in order to in-
crease transparency. The review also produced a standard of mar-
ket integrity for the U.K. comprising transparency, equitable
treatment for market users, and a reliable price formation process
free from misleading and manipulative behavior.
168
Competition for listings and for trades in securities is now an
international rather than a domestic competition. This leads to a
convergence in approaches in the major securities markets. In ad-
dition, the transnationalization of financial market activity gives
regulators incentives to collaborate. 169 Competition and conver-
gence have not affected the statutory bases for suspension of trad-
ing in securities. These bases are different in the U.S. and the U.X.
The SEC's summary power to suspend trading in securities is a
much weaker power than the completely discretionary power of
the London Stock Exchange, which can suspend trading for
months or years on end.1 0 The SIB in the U.K. does not have the
power to act to suspend trading in securities, because the statute
makes the London Stock Exchange the "competent authority" to
deal with listings of securities in the U.K. This means that the
Stock Exchange in the U.K. is a regulatory body itself. 71
The institutional structures within which suspension decisions
are made differ in the two countries; despite these differences,
however, the rules in the two countries regulating suspensions, and
the circumstances in which suspensions occur, are very similar.
168 See generally Press Release, SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, London share trad-
ing to be more transparent-SIB publishes final report of equity market review, PN/SIB/024/
95; SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, REGULATION OF THE UK EQUITY MARKETS:
REPORT BY THE SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD (1995); SECURITIES AND INVEST-
MENTS BOARD, REGULATION OF THE UK EQurry MARKETS: MARKET VIEWS. A DIGEST OF
RESPONSES TO SIB's DISCUSSION PAPER (1995); SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD,
REGULATION OF THE UK EQUITY MARKETS: A DISCUSSION PAPER (1994).
169 On convergence of the U.S. and U.K. regulatory systems see Michael Moran,
Theories of Regulation and Changes in Regulation: The Case of Financial Markets, 34 POL.
STUD. 185, 185-201 (1986).
170 In the U.S., an exchange would tend to delist a security in the circumstances
where a long suspension period would apply in the U.K.
171 On increasing legal controls and public scrutiny of financial and securities mar-
ket activity in the U.K., see Michael Moran, Thatcherism and Financial Regulation, 59
POL. Q. 20, 27 (1988).
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The two countries seem to be developing a shared understanding
of what market integrity and "fair and orderly markets" involve.
6.3 Do the Justifications for Suspensions Work?
At first blush, the idea that two of the major markets for the
trading of securities agree that suspensions of trading in securities
are a good idea in similar circumstances suggests that they may be
right. However, suspension of trading is a rather clumsy tool for
dealing with problems of excess volatility, fraud, and information
asymmetries in securities markets. If exchanges and regulators
were really serious about using suspensions to ensure pricing accu-
racy in their markets, they would presumably be more serious than
they appear to be about maintaining consistency in the application
of their suspensions policy. If suspensions are based on a concern
that the market is inadequately informed about matters relevant to
the value of a particular security--often as a result of action by the
issuer's management or investigation by journalists-there are
likely to be similar situations that are treated differently. Different
corporate managements will take different views about their risk of
liability if they do not ask the exchange to suspend trading. 7 ' If
similar situations are treated differently, this suggests that the idea
of "fair and orderly markets" is being undermined. In any event,
federal securities regulation in the U.S. is not supposed to be merit
regulation. The term is not used in the U.K., because of different
circumstances, but the London Stock Exchange does not claim to
provide any guarantees about the merits of securities it lists; it risks
no liability if it is negligent in listing a security. The idea that ex-
changes might carry out suspensions to reduce their own risk of
liability is not really credible. Exchanges and securities regulators
do not guarantee pricing accuracy in their markets, although they
do act to encourage pricing accuracy according to particular views
of what is relevant to the price of a security.
Another explanation for suspensions of trading in securities is
that they are implemented to protect the exchange's competitive
position. An exchange that suspends trading in securities on the
basis of fraud or inadequate information in the market or breach
of its listing rules is signaling that it is a market more concerned
with ensuring proper behavior than are its competitors. 73 It could
argue that it provides a fairer market than its competitors. For the
172 The risk of liability is likely to be greater in the U.S. than in the U.K.
173 Courts have recognized that action by an exchange to show that it has high
standards may promote the confidence of investors in it and therefore help its com-
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exchange, this is a difficult calculation: investors may like the idea
of a level playing field, but if surveillance to ensure fairness in-
volves high costs, these costs may drive investors away. 174 It has
been argued that, because of competition from non-exchange mar-
kets that are attracting increasing proportions of trades by institu-
tional investors who wish to ensure that their trades are not
transparent, exchange markets are increasingly dependent on
small investors and need to work to maintain their confidence.
Small investors provide liquidity, which is crucial to an exchange
market.1
75
6.4 When are Suspensions Justified?
Exchanges may have various reasons for deciding to suspend
trading in a particular security, or in the market as a whole. As a
matter of regulatory policy, however, there should be some restric-
tions on the ability of exchanges to act in this manner. Suspen-
sions of trading in securities do involve costs, and they are only
justified when it is clear that the costs imposed by the suspension
outweigh the costs of not suspending trading. This calculation is
not likely to be an easy one. Short suspensions are likely to be
more easily justifiable than lengthy suspensions, but it is not always
easy to predict (from the outside) whether a particular suspension
will be lengthy or not. Regulators and exchanges should take into
petitive position. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 268 (2d
Cir. 1984). The court noted:
[Tihe company argues that its stock will suffer no loss of liquidity from
NYSE delisting, because the shares are and will continue to be traded
on NASDAQ which Norlin asserts is a comparable market in all re-
spects. At best, this undercuts only one of the three reasons for main-
mining NYSE listing. It does not respond to the point that investors rely
heavily upon the rules of the NYSE to insure fair dealing in corporate
matters. Indeed, the fact that Norlin stock continues to be traded on
NASDAQ even while it is suspended on the NYSE suggests that this in-
vestor confidence may be well placed.
Id.
174 BLUME ET AL., supra note 15, at 214. The authors noted:
Before automation, when virtually all New York Stock Exchange trading
occurred on the floor of the Exchange, the Exchange's surveillance
costs were simply passed on as a cost of trading to investors and/or to
corporations listed on the Exchange. But today-again, thanks to auto-
mation-institutional investors enjoy many options for trading stocks.
The cost of surveillance is one more factor that makes the New York
Stock Exchange more expensive or cumbersome for institutional inves-
tors than trading on regional exchanges or direcdy with each other.
Id.
175 See id. at 239 ("The New York Stock Exchange today benefits from small inves-
tors more than small investors benefit from the New York Stock Exchange.").
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account the possibility of alternative action, such as requiring an-
nouncements as to the inadequacy of information available to the
market, or disciplining corporate officers or others involved in
breaches of the rules.
7.0 CONCLUSION
Statutes in the U.S. and the U.K. mandate rules that are sup-
posed to maintain "fair and orderly" securities markets. The regu-
lators and exchanges that implement these rules have adopted
their own views of what "fair and orderly" securities markets in-
volve. Others might argue that the rules and their implementation
do not, in fact, ensure that the securities markets are either fair or
orderly. Markets are inherently unfair; institutions and profes-
sional investors are in a better position than an ordinary individual
investor to deal in the securities markets. Markets in which arbi-
trage and speculation are rife are not orderly markets.
The suspension or halt of trading in a security involves an at-
tempt to fix the securities market, in order to protect the public or
investors, to ensure the smooth operation of the market, or to
maintain the existence of a "fair and orderly market." Suspensions
occur where fraud is suspected, where the authorities consider that
information relevant to the value of a security is not available to the
market, or where the issuer of a security has failed to comply with
obligations under its agreement with the exchange. This Article
suggests that mechanisms other than the suspension of trading
would often be more appropriate and would result in less harm to
the interests of market participants generally.
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